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I. Introduction
From the 1940s to the 1970s, the world witnessed considerable and
tumultuous change. This change was, on the one hand, based on the
independence realized by the territories that European empires had
controlled during the colonial era. On the other hand, just as the struggle against colonial rule ended, new conflicts erupted in many of these
newly independent nations. In contrast to the colonial era, after the culmination of the Cold War, which reshaped the world order, the number
of newly independent states unable to fulfill their obligations to their
citizens increased. Such failures became apparent as states failed to
provide a certain level of functions that would ensure both the security
and the well-being of their respective populations. Although such crises of statehood are often depicted as mainly internal in nature,1 their
roots and ramifications transcend the intrastate and are often ignored
in the literature.
While there was an increase in violence, some scholars attempted
to identify the reasons underlying the failure of such states to perform
key functions. In doing so, the debate was joined by a body of literature that offered the common assumption that these conflicts usually
come under a state’s failure.2 The “failed state” notion became prominent among people in diplomatic, political, and academic circles, as
it gradually became rooted in the literature. While in the beginning
it concentrated on states within Africa, the label was embraced as an
international concern in the aftermath of the “9/11” terror attacks on

78

Mohamed Omar Hashi

the twin towers in New York City. As a result, failed states were seen
as a threat to international security since such states could potentially
offer a safe haven to terrorist organizations.
Although virtually no one disagrees that the majority of supposed
failed states suffer many severe political, security, and socioeconomic
challenges, the failed-state thesis has come up short in sufficiently
elucidating the development of such obstacles. Furthermore, there is
a lack of clarity and much disagreement, often governed by subjective interpretations, in the academic and policy discourse over how to
define the concept and when and how it should be used.
This brief essay acts as a beginning critique of the failed-states discourse and thought. The intention is to highlight the problems associated with the current debates. It is not the aim here to present a new
approach. The essay will begin with a quick analysis of the theoretical-cum-policy debates underpinning state failure. Thereafter, observation will be made on the apparent growing international security and
political interest in the state-failure thesis, with particular reference to
the recently emerging pathology of terrorism and its implications for
those countries labelled as failed.
II. Failed States
A. Defining Failure
The so-called “failed state” as an approach became prominent at
the beginning of the 1990s, in both academic and policy discourses.
From this period onward, the work published by Helman and Ratner,
entitled Saving Failed States, which emerged from a paradox during
the Cold War, reflects this.3 As noted by Pedersen and colleagues, the
failed-state concept still continues to enjoy widespread popularity for
denoting a situation in which the governmental infrastructure of the
state has collapsed to a serious extent.4 Although there is no single or
commonly agreed upon definition of what constitutes a failed state, the
prevailing literature indicates a certain consensus among existing definitions. Those nations that are perceived to comprise such a category
are viewed as suffering from, or facing the risk of, acute instability. The
increasing focus on the failed-state concept revolves around the notion
that states currently face certain threats, not solely from other nations,
but also from manifold transatlantic threats which stem from states as
well as less powerful actors who have their origins in state failure.
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Most of the failed-state discourses are centered on the lack of a
state’s capacity to carry out the basic services for which it is responsible,
such as ensuring peace and stability, the rule of law, good governance,
effective border control against external threats, and economic growth
and sustainability. According to Zartman, state failure goes beyond
revolt, coup, or protest. It refers to a situation in which a state’s structure, authority, law, and political order have collapsed and need to be
reconstituted in some way.5 Therefore, failure at the state level occurs if
various structures, authority, power, laws, and the political order collapse. The political vacuum that occurs after state failure encourages
non-state actors to take charge of the different roles of the state, leaving
behind the actors (i.e., civil society) that are unable to rebound or fill
the vacuum.6 The concept is associated not only with collapse, but also
as a process in which the state fails to meet its responsibilities due to a
gradual decline in its capacity. As Rotberg delineates it, the failing and
lack of capacity are rooted in the rational choices made by politicians
over time.7
B. Contradictory Interpretations
The literature focusing on failed states has a number of serious flaws.
According to Doornbos, not only does it have too many unclear definitions, but also the perceived causes as well as outcomes of the label
seem to be blurred.8 As stated by Woodward, there are additional complications due to the fact that the state-failure concept attempts to represent the convergence of humanitarian, human rights, development,
and security issues, though the label holds different interpretations
with regard to these terms.9 Such problems can perhaps be attributed
to the fact that a major part of the existing literature on this issue
comes from government-financed research institutions as well as think
tanks. In most cases, these entities work separately from academic
institutions. As noted by Hameiri, with regard to their interpretation
or understanding of this approach, not all these perspectives share
common ground, and additionally they seem to be talking over each
other.10
According to Woodward, a clear definition of this concept is absent,
which could open up the possibility to analyze it empirically.11 The way
the term is defined in the literature is not only vague but also offers a
range of characteristics as well as assumed consequences. Numerous
observers, as well as projects which are to some extent politically ori-
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ented within the literature, have focused on formulating indicators
that are perceived to be logical and supposed to be broadly shared by
failed states. The assumption is that one or more such indicators can
be seen in those states. The suggestion is that the label failed state is
self-evident and applied to particular cases. The condition of one state
compared to the next among such states, however diverse they might
be, is considered to be evidence of what is left relatively unexplained.
As identified by Call, researchers have frequently focused on applying a single solution to states where “symptoms” range from poverty
to internal conflict, expecting that such a solution would be able to
resolve all problems.12
Rotberg has identified various political variables that influence the
level of weakness or failure in a state.13 The main defining characteristic typifying state failure is deeply rooted politicized conflict, which
is broadly aimed at the political center or some form of governmental authority. The argument is that prolonged political conflict occurs
over a prolonged period of time. Hence, during this period, the state
cannot entirely secure its territory and thus conflict becomes the only
form of acceptable interaction among and between armed belligerents.
Somalia, for instance, has broadly been a continuous theatre of politically orchestrated tensions and conflicts, particularly for the past thirty
years.
The different forms of political conflict that have afflicted south
Somalia, for example, over the past twenty years are not problems
that are unique to the region. Rather, they are a reflection of the wider
dimensions of political conflict and the serious obstacles to rehabilitating and reconstructing a brutally battered and fragile state which has
repeatedly failed its society.14 Given that various political and theoretical debates have evidently been closely linked to this concept, it is
important to remember at this point that this way of depicting states
is politically driven, rather than being objectively and empirically
driven.
C. External Actors
The biggest problem with the failed-states thesis is that it completely
ignores any external factors that might have contributed to the supposed failure and does not view conflict within these states as conflicts
between legitimate factions in the political sphere. Rather, it sees these
as turmoil that impartial third-party actors can solve with their poli-
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cies. For instance, the constant pressure to rebuild central state institutions has been labelled as perpetuating the “sickness” in countries like
Somalia. It is said that such a tendency towards central state-building
is a clear result of the myopia induced by the state-failure discourse.
There is an inherent aura of finality with regard to “failure.” It assumes
that a state has reached its nadir and lies at its lowest ebb.15
It similarly depicts countries like Somalia as a blank canvas, whereupon new institutions can be imposed because of the absence of existing governance structures. However, current and past situations in
countries like Somalia have never been static, as there is a persistent
oscillation between worse and better, contrary to what a “failed state”
suggests. Likewise, Somalia is not in a state of blankness, but rather of
political absence. It has a vibrant communications network. Its people
exist within an inter-subjectivity in which society is present.
The problem with the failed-states discourse is that it presents a
narrow historical account of the fragility of such states. It does this by
concentrating entirely on the state’s failure, and hence glosses over the
historical processes that may have brought about such failure. According to Gourevitch, these processes include the inheritance from colonial rulers, interventions by powerful states after the Cold War, and
the legacy of the International Monetary Fund and the World Bank in
relation to their economic interventions (i.e., the structural adjustment
programmes).16 The failed-states thesis primarily sidelines all external
stakeholders and places the responsibility of failure entirely on the
shoulders of the domestic environment.
It assumes that the state is completely responsible for its own failure
and thus disregards all external entities that may be party responsible.
Arguably, this would be misleading, because the idea of assuming the
state to be a remote entity that is entirely responsible for what takes
place within its borders is very simplistic. Consider the degree of globalization in today’s world and how nations are gradually finding
themselves entangled in intercontinental structures, which include,
among others, foreign economic agents and the aid systems to which
they become accountable.17 In other words, the choices that such states
make are not solely finalized by their regimes, but also by a wide range
of other transoceanic actors.
Comprehending the external influences by questioning who currently uses the language of failed states and who it actually serves is
crucial. The state-failure discourse goes back to the Westphalian ideal
of statehood.18 In other words, as noted by Haldén, it has its roots
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in the Global North and has been utilized in Western academic and
political discourse in order to influence the affairs of state in the Global
South.19 Since this concept has its roots in Western academic, security,
and policy discourses, the language used might be significant when
it comes to understanding Western ideas of “failed others” and “successful us.” The study Orientalism, by Edward Saïd, a pioneering effort
in the making of Post-Colonial Studies, suggests that failure could be
expanded in order to reinforce the misleading cultural assumptions of
the “Western world,” facilitating the misrepresentation and distancing
of the “oriental other.”20
As a foundation for policy, the concept might have some serious
limitations, specifically due to the fact that it reflects the interests of
those who adopt it. Such interests may conflict with the interests of
those to whom it refers.21 Certainly, exclusive locally based connotations of responsibility exonerate Western countries, multinational
organizations, and the international financial institutions they control,
with regard to whatever actions these actors may have carried out that
contributed to the so-called failure by the state concerned. Likewise,
such actors do not face the prospect of intrusive policy institutions that
strive to stop whatever policies they may prosecute that could lead to
state collapse.
The failed-states thesis has much to do with expectations based on
modern statehood and the various functions that a state is expected to
fulfill.22 While these scholars are right to identify the ideological facets
related to the representation of state failure, the problem with their
interpretation is that they fail to recognize that the expectations or
functions have in fact changed dramatically over time, consistent with
the role of the state, which has changed in the context of international
economy and security. The failed-state literature is flawed simply
because it usually paints an image of a state that has apparently failed
in a uniform fashion,23 as such failure will be extremely uneven in a
state the size of Somalia. In spite of the fragility of this state, political
conflict in the south-central part of the country means something completely different compared to the northern part, Somaliland. Hence,
the levels or degrees of violence are very different. Furthermore, those
who are responsible for such violence, and their motives, are also different.
According to Coyne and Leeson, the collapse of governments, such
as the one in Somalia, are not only the result of how poorly they were
designed and run, but also due to the fact that existing informal insti-
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tutions, known in Somalia as “Xeer,” have been at odds with the formal
institutions that were adopted.24 The consequence became an inherent
dysfunction across a wide arc of governance. This amplifies the reasons
why there have been unsuccessful interventions carried out by foreign
powers to create new formal institutions with a central government.
III. Security and Political Implications
A. The Politics/Security Nature of Failed States
At the core, intellectual penury is linguistic in nature. The propensity of traditional policymakers is to separate politics from security,
thus depriving themselves of the vocabulary needed to analyze the
terms and the problems faced. The consequences are flawed assumptions: that conflict has taken a considerable leap into anarchy and that
the source of the supposed threats come from tates that are labelled
failed. These breed confusion over operational and strategic concepts.
The idea that conflicts in today’s world are profoundly more complex
and dangerous has been frequently echoed by international security
experts and has become received wisdom.25 Thus, it is hard to reject
the claim that decisive change has occurred.
For instance, the growth of globalization, urbanization, technological improvement, the increase of global threats, and the empowerment
of non-state actors are certainly complex issues that have changed the
international policy and security environments.26 It is befitting and just
that many policymakers and researchers have labored to conceptualize
changes in the international system and their implications for international security. However, though the world has become more complex,
violence and uncertainties have at all times been significant features of
the subjective often associated with the failed-state paradigm.
In the United States, the international security policy of 2002 seems
to indicate two differing security conditions, which developed along
with the ever-expanding issue of globalization since the culmination
of the Cold War. The 2002 policy of the U.S. in relation to international security states that the attacks carried out by terrorist groups
prompted the U.S. to focus sharply on its position as the only world
superpower, the threats from extremists, and the simmering violence
that has erupted since the peaceful end to the Cold War.27
The view that weak or failing states are a key threat in today’s world
indicates an ideational shift in the development of threats in two ways.
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First, it identifies a change in terms of what is seen as an international
security threat. From a realist perspective, states gain security from
striking a balance with other more powerful ones, just as America
did during the Cold War and European states did prior to World War
I. According to Sørensen, for a powerful state to view a weak state
as a threat to its security is vague in terms of a realist view.28 Hence,
the diminishment of security dilemmas has led insecurity dilemmas
to become the new core concern. As stated by Manjikian, this can be
observed in the institutionalization of so-called failing states.29 Terrorism or extremism is diagnosed as a mental disorder, in which failed
states are the bodies and the U.S. is the cure.
Therefore, states whose condition is deteriorating have no sovereignty as they are not part of the decision-making process, just as
patients do not make their own diagnosis or prescribe their own medication. Such top-down (often expressed through medical analogy)
approaches often ignore the target beneficiaries’ real needs and the
absence of ownership, which is crucial for the long-term stability of
these countries. Second, broader change comes from the fact that the
threat from failed states does not derive from the government or political leaders, but rather from actors who operate freely within such
states.30
These non-state actors are not included in the classical theories of
International Relations. The threats from failed states do not mean an
end to the differences among domestic and international affairs that
have been significant since the Peace of Westphalia and the idea of sovereignty. From a Westphalian perspective, a threat is perceived from a
state-centric military standpoint. Internationally, security respects territorial sovereignty as well as the integrity of legitimately independent
and supposedly equal nation-states—a milieu characterized by cooperation and conflicts among such nations in an anarchic environment.31
This may perhaps reflect the pluralist norms of interactions in diplomatic and multilateral terms. In spite of the differences in interpretation
among, for instance, liberal and realist visionaries of the international
system, the way in which threats to security have been perceived and
tackled has largely relied on such statist, pluralist ontology. In today’s
world, the idea that international security risks stem from failed states
is widely adopted. Numerous researchers and political observers have
focused on the risks that are inherent in such states. In accordance with
such arguments, from a conventional Westphalian perspective of international security, threats arise from powerful aggressive states.
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B. The Securitization of the Ungoverned: An Interventionist
Mechanism
There is a strong belief that the label failed state is used primarily to
legitimize potential military and other interventions, which largely
benefit those who are doing the intervening. Today, the new ideological feature of “humanitarian intervention” has had an impact on international relations theory. Even staunch pacifists who are not in favor of
foreign interventions often support such activities, with the caveat that
all forces applied are humanitarian in their focus.32 Apparently, in this
post-Cold War period, world powers make use of their military force
not as an expression of realpolitik, but as a technology to reinstate
good governance, eradicate famine, and safeguard vulnerable communities.33
Human security presently requires comprehension of a global environment in which the strategic concern of states in the Global North
have been overlaid with more diffuse threats that are linked to the
collapse and insurgency stemming from the marginalized people of
the Global South.34 The possibility for people in the northern hemisphere to enjoy their lives is no longer exclusively a local matter since
becoming part of the international political agenda. Securing life for
citizens, for their benefit, has in recent times become an objective of
policy interest. Human security, in this context, appears to require an
enlightened perspective which expands security concerns outside the
state-to-state war to include such threats to life as pandemics, displacement, and pollution.35
Despite this, the grounds on which there is intervention in the affairs
of so-called failed states is often based on the pretext that their lawless
condition threatens international security. As stated by Akpinarli, this
label has been adopted and developed by external actors, presumably
to fix the problems of these countries.36 Hence, such actors advocate
and justify military intervention in order to safeguard the supposed
security.
Nevertheless, it can be argued that the failed-state label actually
brings more problems than it fixes—not only with regard to military
intervention but also by keeping such states on the margins of international relationships. In fact, it is not misleading to suggest that the
term failed state is a clear case of what is called securitization, which is
based on the assumptions of the Copenhagen School of Security. As stated
by Buzan and colleagues, those who developed this approach suggest
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that a discourse that adopts a way of offering something to deal with
an existential threat to the referent object does not produce securitization.37 They state that an issue is securitized if, and only if, the audience, who are the ordinary citizens in the North, accept the label of
failed state. In this instance, the mainstream media and large corporations who work with, in, or for failed states act as agents for securitizing actors.

1. Failed States and Terrorism Nexus
According to authors such as Helman and Ratner38 and Raeymakers,39
the strategic impact of a failed state has shifted from being a local to an
international threat. The United States sees such a state as a real security threat. A proliferation of weapons of mass destructions, expansion of networks used by criminals, along with those offering a safe
haven to terror groups,40 creates a source of serious threats. The result
is that spheres of international security have become entwined and
political policies are constructed to implement security policy. This
securitization of failed states has come under growing criticism since
the assumption that failed states breed extremism is disputed. Thus,
the situation is deemed not as simple as construed by policy gurus and
general assumptions by Western powers. On the other hand, traditionalists claim that the term security has gradually become stretched too
far by including all political matters, in the process becoming devoid of
all meaning and analytical significance through indiscriminate application.41
The observation that failed states pose a threat to international security is an eminently reasonable one; however, this must be qualified by
the secondary observation that failed states in themselves do not necessarily generate threats. Connecting the concept to extremism is easy
to do as it clusters all such states together and puts them under the
failed-states discourse umbrella.42 Therefore, the association between
state weakness or failure with international terrorism is very complex
and more tenuous than is generally assumed. The idea that all the
states that have been labelled as failures are characterized and afflicted
by terrorism is unsubstantiated. In fact, the majority of states dubbed
as the least developed by the United Nations do not have any terrorism activities.43
Current challenges relating to insurgents and terrorism have also
broken the carefully constructed, but unsustainable, binary between
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international security and politics. It is tempting to assign this cognitive dissonance to the maxim that insurgence and terror are prodigious
and political forms of warfare.44 However, this often-held perception
ignores the immensely political character of conventional engagements.
It might be more accurate to suggest that conflicts against non-state
powers put the political dimensions of conflicts into a clearer perspective, and in doing so reveal some of the flaws of the techno-scientific
rationale. Due to the underdevelopment of political vocabulary, the
main emphasis is on the capabilities and crimes of international terrorist and insurgent groups, but little on their goals, beliefs, strategic
cultures, and motives.45 Although capabilities are significant, the aims
and motives determine the contexts in which they are called upon. For
example, the consensus about states labelled as failed is confined to
the observation that terror groups occupy ungoverned regions and use
them to plan their attacks.
But none of the powerful countries, especially the United States,
have the resources to project power into every ungoverned region.
In fact, doing so would not be effective in an environment in which
such groups can successfully plan and organize attacks while living
in orderly, Western, urban environments.46 The fact is that many such
terrorist acts are internal in nature, driven by grievances stemming
from political or national struggles. A clear example of this is Sri Lanka’s Tamil Tigers.47 As Bilgin and Morton state, the state-failure discourse permits particular political agendas that only help the political
and security benefits of the ones who use it. Hence, the label failed
state, and the discourses related to it, is not neutral but developed by
certain governments to forward their own political agendas. Furthermore, researchers like Von Hippel have suggested that some states that
come under this label will be deemed to be Orwell’s Animal Farm.48 For
instance, if authoritarian regimes maintain their grip over the mechanisms of their states, they will not fail. An example of this is perhaps
Saudi Arabia. Other cases, such as Pakistan, do however attract terrorism, as stated by Patrick, who suggests that the failed-state discourse
is specifically applied to states that powerful Northern governments
think should be labelled in this way.49 The results of categorizing some
states as failed can currently be seen in Iraq, Afghanistan, and Somalia.
However, such labelling is itself not always accurate. But this inaccuracy can allow those Northern powers to justify a democratization
drive in the guise of humanitarian interventions and countering and
preventing terror. According to Patrick, the democratic peace concept
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is promoted by those who justify democratization in the context of the
so-called war on terror.50 Others, such as Logan and Preble, consider
that states in the Global North, particularly the United States, often
arbitrarily link terrorist actions to a very broad and generalized definition of state failure so as to justify the war on terror.51
Empirical data on failed states are said to have shown that state
failure rarely translates into a security threat to the international community. Hence, this is the reason why some have suggested that states
in the North are guilty of “strategic overkill” in terms of the way the
international security threat arising from failed states is exaggerated.
This strategic overkill depends on a generalized definition of failed
states instead of an in-depth assessment of the unique dynamics based
on politics, culture, and economics that exist in such environments.52
Nevertheless, it would be wrong to suggest that theorists on this issue
are entirely responsible for the obvious ideological misuse of this analytical implementation by Northern politicians, just as it would be
unreasonable to hold Karl Marx’s ideas responsible for the wrongdoing of Joseph Stalin. However, in spite of this, many conceptual weaknesses have been recognized by critics of the failed-states framework.
IV. Concluding Remarks
This article has briefly pointed out some of the complexities of the
failed-state paradigm and the diverse debates surrounding its use in
the academic, political, policy, and security spheres. The article affirms
that states labelled as failed display a number of pathologies which
have a major detrimental effect on the well-being of their peoples and
on international security. Despite this, the securitization of failed states
in political as well as academic discourse depicts a subjectively Western-driven development of international security. This has a range of
consequences for political security. In contradistinction, this article
identifies an important difference between the notion of a failed state,
as epitomized in political and academic discourses, and the realities of
state failure, which are wildly disputed. Thus, the subjective interpretation and construction of a threat and a challenge can and does have a
significant material impact on funding, over legitimacy of the conversation, diplomatic focus, and, most probably, even military intervention.
The securitization of such states strengthens the tendency to externalize threats in the southern hemisphere or even to demonize the
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Global South as an excuse for domination and intervention. The result
here is a lack of understanding and respect for the difficulties and
problems existing elsewhere. Furthermore, there is a failure to appreciate the idea that such obstacles are to an extent the result of pathologies intrinsic to the international system.
That is not to say that the label of failed state, with all its complexities and problems, should be abandoned. Given that this approach
has gained in popularity over the years, it suggests a genuine need
to contemplate more deeply the nature of international political and
security issues. Researchers who focus on security policy should reevaluate and question some of the fundamental assumptions of their
work with regard to the forces as well as the ontologies of politics
and security from an international perspective. A critical approach to
defining and measuring such states is required. Conventional methods
have to develop and become more nuanced and distinguished in their
understanding of such states so as to establish a more credible and less
politically prejudiced empirical examination as part of this approach.
Consecutively, conceptually critical concepts that seem to disapprove of this approach out of hand, as an ambiguous hegemonic
method, should attempt to engage more with this approach and make
more of an effort to go beyond the failure-or-success binary thinking that is suggested by the failed-state approach. Collectively, more
innovative concepts may assist in broadening the understanding of the
nature of international security and politics, and possibly help to create policies that address the epochal obstacles faced by the most brittle
states.
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